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Keeping GM Van Nuys Open 
Abstract 
[Excerpt] In Van Nuys, for the past four years, we have been building a movement of our own local union, 
the Chicano and black communities, clergy, intellectuals, students and small businesspeople to demand 
that General Motors keep open a profitable plant it has threatened to close. The basic premise of the 
struggle—that we do not recognize GM's plant as "private property" but see it as a "joint venture" between 
capital, labor and minority communities — flies in the face of GM's worldview and the dominant business 
ideology of the times. Our impressive organizing successes indicate that a revitalized labor movement 
can rebuild powerful coalitions in opposition to big business. It is a small, but hopeful, example of grass-
roots regional planning — from the bottom up. 
But, as we will describe, recent efforts by General Motors, representatives of our International union, and a 
company-oriented faction of our local have been pursuing a strategy of competition with other UAW 
locals to try to save our plant at the expense of others. If this strategy of "company-unionism" succeeds 
over the strategy of community-based demands for corporate responsibility, then once again a declining 
labor movement will have rescued corporate greed from the jaws of defeat. 
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For the past four years, UAW Local 645 has been carrying out a 
bold campaign to stop a plant closing before it happens—in this 
case, the General Motors Assembly Plant in Van Nuys, California. 
I've been asked to analyze our movement from the perspective 
of regional economic planning. 
In most of my experience, "regional planning" has been a highly 
Utopian undertaking. Well-meaning intellectuals dream, "Let's see, 
we can put the solar-paneled factory over there, right next to the 
workers' recreation and child-care center." In reality, American 
capitalism is going through one of its most decadent and 
anarchistic periods in history. In the age of Reagan Republicans 
and neo-Reagan Democrats, any form of rational and democratic 
planning is attacked as violating free enterprise, while the 
inherently anti-social tendencies of corporations are now out of 
control. Working people are suffering as profitable plants are 
closed in pursuit of even greater profits, as the captains of industry 
become captains of megamergers, paper transactions, and the 
heralded transition to the "information and service economy"— 
captains of destroying our nation's industrial infrastructure. In this 
• Eric Mann is Coordinator of UAW Local 645's Campaign to Keep GM Van Nuys 
Open. 
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frightening context, how does the labor movement even begin to 
raise any issues of democratic economic planning? 
In Van Nuys, for the past four years, we have been building a 
movement of our own local union, the Chicano and black 
communities, clergy, intellectuals, students and small businesspeople 
to demand that General Motors keep open a profitable plant it 
has threatened to close. The basic premise of the struggle—that 
we do not recognize GM's plant as "private property" but see it 
as a "joint venture" between capital, labor and minority communities 
—flies in the face of GM's worldview and the dominant business 
ideology of the times. Our impressive organizing successes indicate 
that a revitalized labor movement can rebuild powerful coalitions 
in opposition to big business. It is a small, but hopeful, example 
of grass-roots regional planning—from the bottom up. 
But, as we will describe, recent efforts by General Motors, 
representatives of our International union, and a company-
oriented faction of our local have been pursuing a strategy of 
competition with other UAW locals to try to save our plant at the 
expense of others. If this strategy of "company-unionism" succeeds 
over the strategy of community-based demands for corporate 
responsibility, then once again a declining labor movement will 
have rescued corporate greed from the jaws of defeat. 
Early History of the Campaign 
The Campaign to Keep GM Van Nuys Open has been a conscious 
organizing strategy from the beginning. From 1980 to 1982, five 
out of California's six auto plants were closed, over 21,000 workers 
lost their jobs, and Van Nuys was the last plant remaining. The 
Campaign was initiated by UAW members with backgrounds in 
the civil rights, Chicano and Asian-American movements, who 
came together in our local's Political Action Committee. 
The Big Three were carrying out a regional disinvestment 
strategy. They decided it was cheaper to produce virtually all their 
cars from a centralized midwestern hub, shipping completed cars 
throughout the U.S., rather than produce parts in the midwest, 
ship them to Van Nuys to be assembled, and then "back ship" 
completed cars east of the Rockies. 
But how did they back ship all these years and still make a profit? 
We were told that GM was still making a substantial profit in Van 
Nuys, but that, given foreign competition and a surplus of plant 
capacity, it was having a competition to see which plants could 
be most profitable, with the less profitable being closed. 
We countered this argument on two levels. First, we opposed 
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"profit maximization" strategies. We do not think the labor 
movement should be chasing after corporations to constantly 
provide answers to how to make corporations like GM, with over 
$4 billion in profits the past two years, even more profitable. That 
only provides the justification for plant closings, layoffs, and 
speedups. 
But we also came up with a plan, in conjunction with business 
students at UCLA and small businesspeople from the Chamber 
of Commerce. We demanded that GM build a stamping plant in 
Los Angeles, hiring laid-off Southgate and Bethlehem workers, and 
that it purchase more parts from local contractors. This would 
solve GM's problem of just assembling the cars on the west coast; 
now, virtually the entire car could be built in California and 
targeted for a west coast market. This has won more allies to our 
side, and put GM on the defensive. But how could we provide 
the "muscle" to enforce these ideas? 
After months of discussion, we agreed on an exciting strategy 
we believed could save our plant. While GM openly admitted they 
wanted to get out of Los Angeles, it coveted the Southern 
California auto market, the largest new car market in the United 
States. If we could build a pre-emptive movement to effectively 
threaten a boycott of General Motors products in greater Los 
Angeles, and could convince GM of the viability of that threat, 
we could head off the closing. Our plan was to organize a greater 
metropolitan market of over 10 million people to support our 
demands. 
Key Elements of our Coalition 
Building a movement far ahead of a plant closing gives the 
organizers strategic initiative. But it lacks some of the urgency of 
a movement built after the company announces the closing. 
Initially many of the workers felt, "It's GM's plant." Traditional 
trade union practice had convinced many workers that the union's 
only role was to negotiate over the terms of the closure. But when 
we explained that the workers had contributed decades of profits 
to GM, that surrounding communities had developed stores, 
homes and social services based on GM's permanency, and that 
they purchased many GM products—we convinced many workers 
that the UAW and the community should have a voice in the future 
of the plant. 
A second round of doubts then surfaced: "Maybe we should just 
leave GM alone, since provoking them will only bring the closing 
sooner," and "GM will never let anyone tell them what to do with 
lit 
•': Ml 
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their money they're too big, we can't win." Finally we found a 
core of workers who believed in both the morality and strategy 
of the Campaign and who felt that at least it was worth a try. Most 
of these workers were veterans of other closed-down industrial 
plants, where they had seen doubts and indecision lead to human 
suffering and an impotent union response. 
Pete Beltran, our local President, began at GM in his early 20's 
on the assembly line. Now in his mid-40's, he is a self-educated 
man with a sophisticated understanding of labor history, labor law, 
and the internal machinations of union politics. Unlike the growing 
epidemic of "cooperative" local union leaders, Beltran is not 
intimidated by GM management, and was in tune with an activist 
and confrontational response to GM's corporate blackmail. While 
skeptical about the Campaign's prospects in the early stages, he 
felt it was worth a try, and was willing to give its organizers the 
full support of his office. 
While there are always many elements in the community a 
union can reach out to, a successful coalition has to have a strong 
core. We targeted the black and Chicano communities to help us 
build our Campaign. 
Twenty years after the Watts rebellions of 1966, black unemploy-
ment in South Central Los Angeles has remained virtually 
unchanged. The main culprits—the closing of Bethlehem Steel, 
Goodyear and Firestone Rubber, and GM's Southgate plant. These 
plants provided good paying unionized jobs, and their workers 
were stable and creative members of the community. When some 
1,000 Southgate workers were able to transfer to Van Nuys, many 
groups in the black community vowed that GM would not close 
them out a second time. 
Los Angeles has a Latino community of over 3 million people, 
the greatest concentration of whom are Mexican-Americans. Many 
of the top officers of UAW Local 645 are active in the Mexican-
American Political Association (MAPA) and various Latino labor 
coalitions. The local has actively defended the rights of 
undocumented workers and has initiated organizing drives among 
low-paid immigrant workers in surrounding sweatshops. Thus, the 
local's outward political stance has won it many allies, who were 
willing to take on General Motors. 
Central to our strategy was that the existing relations between 
labor unions, corporations, and both political parties were causes 
of the problems of plant closings. We had to find constituencies 
who were outside of this "gentlemen's agreement" who could help 
find the solution. Over several years of organizing, we built strong 
relationships with leaders in the Baptist Ministers Conference, 
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individual Catholic priests, MAPA, and the Rainbow Coalition-
forces with strong activist histories, the networks to carry out 
effective boycotts, and their own independent interests in keeping 
our plant open. 
Initial Successes 
The action component of the strategy was kicked off when GM 
laid off our second shift in November 1982 and threatened to close 
the whole plant. We began a series of large and militant rallies 
and marches, with the threat of the boycott as the central theme. 
An angry group of second shift workers fueled the early stages 
of the Campaign. 
When the second shift returned in the spring of 1983, our 
strategy had already evolved towards greater community empha-
sis. Through months of organizing by teams of UAW members, 
we brought more than 200 key representatives of church, labor 
and minority communities to a Community Leadership Meeting 
that demanded a face-to-face discussion with either GM Chairman 
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Roger Smith or President R James McDonald. 
Our friends in the media said it was a brilliant ploy, because 
GM would look bad when they didn't show, but no one believed 
GM would mee t wi th the coalition. W h e n U.S. Congressman 
Howard Berman, the coalition's liaison, met with Roger Smith to 
set up the meeting, Smith expressed anger at the constant talk of 
a boycott. But precisely because the coalition was a completely 
separate entity from the union, and was not something GM could 
handle wi th in the collective bargaining apparatus, GM decided 
to meet w i th the labor-community coalition. 
At the meet ing in January 1984, President McDonald boldly 
asserted GM's management rights, and made it clear the plant was 
in danger of being closed. The coalition, in equally bold style, went 
into great detail about its commi tment to carry out the boycott 
and its m e m b e r s ' past track record at successful boycotts. 
McDonald left the meeting somewhat shaken. 
As w e we re leaving the room, Assemblywoman Maxine Waters 
(along wi th Congressman Berman, one of the few elected officials 
to have w o n the confidence of our members) confronted 
McDonald, and asked if she could tell the press that the plant 
would be there for at least two more years. McDonald paused, 
and then said, "Yes." Maxine pushed the point, "Can I tell the press 
three more years?" McDonald said, "No. 1986 is w h e n we have 
to make some hard decisions." Maxine turned to the coalition 
m e m b e r s and said, "Now here I a m in the legislature trying to 
get 90 days ' advance notice on plant closings, and they say m y 
bill is 'too radical.' But our coalition just got two years ' advance 
notice from GM." 
Word quickly spread through the plant that we had won a two-
year commitment , and the prestige of the Campaign mounted. But 
it also led to a letdown among m a n y of our supporters— "call m e 
in a year and a half; I need my weekends to recuperate." We 
wan ted to keep the most active workers involved, since you can't 
allow a movement to fall apart and then just revitalize it at will. 
A politically committed filmmaker, Michal Goldman, encouraged 
us to make a film about our movement . Tiger by the Tail has 
become an award-winning documentary, and has been valuable 
both in telling our story to communi ty groups in the Los Angeles 
area and in encouraging similar union campaigns in other par ts 
of the country. Our plan was to go into a phase of slow-but-steady 
communi ty outreach, awaiting the next crisis. The next crisis came 
sooner t han expected. 
After the McDonald meeting, G M changed its strategy towards 
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manager, Ernie Schaefer, skilled in the double-talk of the new non-
adversarial labor relations. Schaefer denied the plant was in 
trouble and blamed all the talk about a possible plant closing on 
"those who would try to benefit from spreading negativity." 
Then in November 1985, when trade newspapers began to print 
articles that GM was again planning a series of closings and Van 
Nuys was high on the "danger list," Schaefer began to spread a 
little negativity of his own. In memos to the workforce, he told 
us that GM had no car for our plant past the 1988 model, and 
that if we did not accept "new cooperative labor relations," the 
so-called "team concept," GM would not even consider a new 
model and would close the plant. 
Our Shop Chairman Ray Ruiz endorsed the plan as the best way 
to save the plant—arguing that the Campaign had become 
outmoded. President Beltran did not directly oppose the team 
concept, but he focused on the Campaign's demand for a 10-year 
commitment. If General Motors wanted cooperation, the first step 
was to make that 10-year commitment. He also argued that rather 
than being outmoded, the Campaign was the only thing that gave 
us any leverage in these discussions. 
GM Splits the Local 
GM took the position that the team concept must be passed 
without conditions, as GM was not in the business of making long-
term commitments. A vote on the team concept was only an entry 
fee into the lottery to keep plants open. 
What followed was one of the dirtiest efforts I've witnessed. The 
company began a systematic slander campaign, with strong 
support from the "cooperation faction" of the union. GM argued 
that Beltran's militancy, not its greed, would lead to the plant being 
closed. 
A supposed "Quality of Worklife" publication, The Night Owl, 
openly argued that we were in a "Super Bowl against the Norwood 
team" (Norwood is our Ohio sister plant that also produces 
Camaros and Firebirds), and that if we did not vote for the team 
concept, Norwood would win the "game." We argued that instead 
of uniting local unions against General Motors, this approach 
would make our union a confederation of locals competing against 
each other to see whose plant will be closed. 
The company's new demands left us disoriented. If we were 
in a new plant in the midwest, we would clearly have taken a 
strong stand against the team concept—which is actually a plan 
to eliminate jobs, speed up the line, and get workers to adopt 
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Jesse Jackson and Ed Asner express solidarity with UAW Local 
645 President Pete Beltran (right) and Eric Mann (left). 
management attitudes and impose "peer pressure" on each other 
to work harder and faster. But we were the ones who had 
emphasized the grave danger of the plant closing, and there was 
a growing chorus from the press attacking Beltran and arguing 
that the workers should either "Change or Die'1—that is, accept 
the company's proposal or deserve to be closed. We were afraid 
that if we led the opposition and won, the company would then 
use the "no" vote as the excuse to close the plant. But if we 
acquiesced, the union would be structurally weakened and a later 
fight against a closing would be even harder. To make things worse, 
under growing pressure from Detroit, the Regional UAW, which 
had previously been sympathetic to the Campaign, became 
actively involved in the negotiations and made it clear that a 
"team" agreement was the way to save the plant. 
I must have talked to over 200 workers to try to find my bearings 
and understand how they were seeing it. The overwhelming 
consensus argued: 
"Look. It's blackmail. But we should vote for it. If the 'team 
concept' is unbearable we can always vote it out later. And if it's 
not as bad as we expect, and we get a new car, at least we'll have 
our jobs. And if they double-cross us, and close the plant anyway, 
I'll be the first one on the picket line for the boycott." 
But while that logic w 
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But while that logic was seductive, the growing viciousness of 
the campaign against those of us who opposed it contradicted that 
view. Anonymous leaflets vented slanderous personal attacks on 
Pete, Mike Gomez (our Political Action chair) and myself, and 
argued that we would be responsible for the plant's closing. 
The short-term result of this company campaign, with internal 
union support, was that a slate of delegates who supported the 
team concept were overwhelmingly elected as delegates to the 
UAW Convention, and Pete was defeated. 
A week after Pete's defeat, the Campaign held a rally we had 
been planning for four months. On the surface, it was our most 
successful rally. Over 1,000 people came, and it once again 
reflected the enormous breadth of our support in Los Angeles. 
But our movement was in trouble. 
The press was gloating over the fact that Pete had lost the 
delegate election, and was implying that he was a lame-duck 
president. The press thought that the growing split in our local 
was a much better story than our continuing Campaign to pressure 
GM for a commitment. And to some degree they were right, 
because GM's main goal has been to get rid of Beltran, to stop 
the Campaign, and to bring this whole issue of plant closings back 
to where it belongs—as a powerful tool for management control, 
not one for labor organizing. 
It Ain't Over Till It's Over 
One thing I have learned in several decades of organizing is that 
victories and defeats don't linger long, and that history is a 
constantly changing process. 
The union "cooperation team," arrogant with its election victory, 
tried to push through the "team concept" vote without giving the 
workers contract language in writing. Pete Beltran spoke against 
the agreement, arguing to the Regional leadership that if they 
thought these team agreements were so good, they should make 
them part of the upcoming national contract, which the member-
ship could vote up or down, rather than imposing them on locals 
one at a time with the threat of a plant closing hanging over them. 
The "team concept" was only passed 53% to 47%, and many 
people I spoke to who grudgingly voted for it told me they came 
away from the meetings with enormous respect for Beltran's 
courage. Those who believe they will defeat Beltran for president 
this May, which is now the company's main objective, may be 
very surprised at the outcome. 
The second shift, which provided the main margin to pass the 
1
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"team concept," did so out of a real sense of their greater 
vulnerability. GM showed its appreciation by laying off the second 
shift July 3, with rumors that the layoff might be quite long. 
Our supporters in the community keep up their excellent work. 
Reverend Dick Gillett has formed a new group called Work, 
Economics and Religion, and is doing extensive outreach, 
especially to Protestant clergy. Peter Olney, a long-time activist 
and a student at UCLA's Graduate School of Management, has 
prepared an important field study on the feasibility of the boycott. 
If GM executives read .the report, they will have trouble dismissing 
the results. Professor Rudy Acuna, with deep ties to Chicano 
faculty and students throughout the southwest, is speaking and 
writing about GM's arrogance towards the Chicano community 
and its browbeating of a predominantly Chicano workforce. 
Now that General Motors has decided to play a heavy hand in 
the affairs of our local, and to use its threat of a plant closing so 
overtly and systematically, there is no doubt that America's largest 
industrial corporation will win some short-term victories against 
a single union local of 4,000 members. But while many workers 
are discussing shopfloor strategies to counter GM's growing 
intimidation within the plant, GM's strongest suit is the threat 
of the plant closing, not its actuality. If GM ever closes down the 
Van Nuys plant, there is at least a realistic historical possibility 
that the payback will be substantial. As Father Luis Olivares, one 
of our strongest community allies, expressed it: 
"It's quite possible that General Motors, in its imperial 
arrogance, will not take the Coalition seriously enough 
to change their plans. My worst fear is they will play with 
the workers for a few years, and then after squeezing out 
everything they can, close down the plant anyway. If that 
happens, we will have no choice but to carry out the 
boycott, and show GM it made a serious miscalculation. 
Then, in the future, when people stand up against these 
companies, and talk about boycotts, they will remember 
the Van Nuys movement and think twice before they close 
a plant." • 
'^
pWir^f^v^''^^i,*^'Wf!^ n'wmm^w-f^^^^^^fm;' 
Directed by 
Michal Goldman 
Written by 
Eric Mann 
Narrated by 
Ed Asner 
"The UAW-led movement 
in Van Nuys is one of the 
most advanced laboratories 
for building a movement to 
stop a plant closing-before 
it happens. 
"In Tiger by the Tail we learn a, 
multi-racial and community coi 
rebirth of a progressive, hard-hea 
It's an excellent film." 
Co-author, The 
This 40-minute color film can be 
cassette for $200 (includes post 
available for low-budget commun 
Order from: LABOR/COMMUNir 
6151 Van Nuys Blvd., 
(213) 931-9888 
